Mexico's economy in 1998 and 1999 by Lucinda Vargas
Mexico’s economy in the second half of the 1990s
has experienced some dramatic moments, which
essentially started with an unexpected peso devalua-
tion in December 1994. This was followed in 1995 by
the most severe economic crisis Mexico has witnessed
since the 1930s. Yet, later that year a recovery was
already under way, which solidified in 1996 and 1997.
Then, in 1998, Mexico was hit by several external
shocks that pushed the economy into lower-than-
expected growth and higher-than-expected inflation.
This article examines Mexico’s 1998 economic perfor-
mance and discusses this year’s outlook.
KEY MACROECONOMIC INDICATORS IN 1998
Three external shocks impacted Mexico’s economy
in 1998. First, as a result of the Asian financial crisis,
which started in 1997 and continued into 1998, other
emerging economies such as Mexico’s saw their capital
inflows reduced through the so-called contagion effect.
Second, the price of oil dropped sharply in interna-
tional markets throughout the year (Chart 1), which
affected Mexico’s public finances since oil revenues
represent about a third of total government revenues.
Finally, Russia’s debt default in August sent shock
waves throughout emerging economies as internation-
al investors once again withdrew from these countries.
Mexico was not immune to this new round of conta-
gion effects, suffering a downturn in its capital inflows.
Chart 2 shows the decreased portfolio investments re-
ceived by Mexico and other selected regions in 1998
relative to the previous two years.
Despite this adverse external environment, Mexico
emerged in 1998 with healthy 4.8-percent gross domes-
tic product (GDP) growth (Chart 3). Though this rate
was lower than original expectations of over 5 percent,
it still placed Mexico among the fastest growing econo-
mies in 1998. Of the 34 countries listed in Table 1, only
Although Mexico’s
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BusinessFrontierfour—Ireland, China, India and Taiwan—outper-
formed Mexico in GDP growth last year.
On the inflation front, Mexico finished the year
with a higher-than-expected rate of 18.6 percent.
Despite the Mexican authorities’ efforts to keep
inflation down by following the appropriate fiscal
and monetary policies, they were unable to fully
control the negative effects of contagion on this
indicator. Last year’s inflation was not only higher
than the previous year’s, it also exceeded the gov-
ernment’s 1998 target of 12 percent (Chart 4).
The 1998 performance of other key macro-
economic indicators was as follows:
• Interest Rates. Both the 28-day Cetes rate
and the average interbank interest rate (TIIP) were
higher in 1998 than in 1997. As Chart 5 shows,
Chart 1
Average Export Price of Mexican Oil, 1997–98
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SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática with
data from Petróleos Mexicanos.
Chart 2
Portfolio Investment in Selected Regions, 1996–98












* Korea, Singapore and Taiwan.
† Includes China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand, among
others.
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SOURCE OF PRIMARY DATA: Instituto Nacional de Estadística,
Geografía e Informática.
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2 Business Frontierboth benchmark interest rates hovered around 20
percent for the first seven months of the year.
Mexican interest rates surged in response to
Russia’s August debt moratorium and spiked in
September to 41 percent. During the last quarter,
however, interest rates eased from their September
peak. The Cetes and TIIP rates averaged 24.7 per-
cent and 26.7 percent, respectively, in 1998, up
from 19.8 percent and 21.2 percent in 1997.
• Exchange Rate. As with interest rates,
Russia’s debt default was a key element in the per-
formance of the peso–dollar exchange rate in
1998. Moreover, the two other external factors—
the declining price of oil and the lingering effects
of the Asian crisis—contributed to the volatility
exhibited by this indicator for most of 1998. While
the exchange rate averaged 8.2 pesos per dollar in
January, it lost ground during the following months
and slipped considerably in August (Chart 6 ).
Though the exchange rate stabilized thereafter,
the year-end rate equaled 9.9 pesos per 
dollar, a depreciation of 22 percent relative to
year-end 1997.
• Budget Deficit. Mexico’s 1998 budget
deficit target, announced at the beginning of the
year, was 1.25 percent of GDP. Given this tight 
fiscal policy objective, Mexico was forced to cut
its budget three times during the year in re-
sponse to the reduction in public oil revenues
brought about by the plummeting oil prices.
Mexico was successful in controlling its public
finances last year: the actual budget deficit was
1.24 percent of GDP.
• Employment and Unemployment. Em-
ployment grew 8 percent in 1998, equaling the
1997 rate and surpassing the 1996 rate (Chart 7).
Employment has been rising since Mexico’s 1995
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Chart 6
Exchange Rate, 1998
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SOURCE: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática with
data from Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social.
3 Issue 1 • 1999percent. Conversely, Mexico’s open unemploy-
ment rate has come down since 1995. Last year,
the rate fell to 3.2 percent, below the 1997 rate as
well as the rate prevailing before the 1995 crisis
(Chart 8). Although this is certainly good news
for Mexico, it should be kept in mind that these
figures pertain to a narrow definition of unem-
ployment. Other measures depict a higher unem-
ployment and underemployment picture, though
even these indicators have improved since 1995
(see box titled “Mexican Unemployment Measures”).
• Consumption and Investment. Two
important components of growth in 1998 were
private consumer demand and private investment.
Last year, private consumption grew 6.4 percent,
consolidating growth of over 6 percent reached 
in 1997. Boosting consumption in 1998 were em-
ployment growth, double-digit salary increases
and lower household debt. Total investment last
year managed healthy growth of 10.7 percent,
thanks to 17-percent growth in private investment.
Public investment, as expected, dropped signifi-
cantly in 1998 (by –20.4 percent) as a result of the
impact of lower oil prices on public revenues.
• Retail Sales. Last year’s retail sales perfor-
mance reflected the healthy growth in consump-
tion. Retail sales grew 8 percent in 1998, their
strongest showing since the 1995 crisis, when they
shrank almost 19 percent (Chart 9).
• International Trade. Mexico recorded a
$7.7 billion trade deficit last year, the result of
$117.5 billion in exports and $125.2 billion in
imports (Chart 10). While total export growth
slowed substantially in 1998, import growth re-
mained strong. Exports grew only 6.4 percent in
1998, down from 15 percent the previous year.
The downturn in this indicator was strongly affect-
ed by the drop in the value of oil exports due to
depressed oil prices. Exports of manufactured
goods, for example, continued strong in 1998,
with nearly 12 percent growth. Total merchandise
imports, on the other hand, managed double-digit
growth of over 14 percent last year. Especially
strong were consumption goods imports, which
grew over 19 percent and reflected the economy’s
overall strong consumer demand.
• Foreign Direct Investment and Inter-
national Reserves. Although the external shocks
Mexico suffered last year negatively affected its
portfolio investment, they did not dampen
Mexico’s ability to attract long-term foreign direct
investment. Foreign direct investment totaled
more than $10 billion in 1998 (Chart 11), con-
tributing to Mexico’s gain in international reserves
last year despite the country’s volatile short-term
capital inflows. International reserves at year-end
1998 were $30.1 billion, an increase of over $2 bil-
lion from year-end 1997.
Chart 8
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4 Business FrontierMexico’s open unemployment rate has a very narrow
definition. It is derived from considering as employed
anybody who worked at least one hour in the week before
the unemployment survey is applied to Mexican house-
holds. Therefore, the open unemployment rate would not
capture a large portion of the unemployed or underem-
ployed in Mexico.
Other unemployment indicators, however, incorporate
broader definitions of unemployment and better reflect
Mexico’s true unemployment and underemployment con-
ditions. These complementary unemployment rates, to-
gether with the open unemployment rate, are defined
below.1
Open unemployment rate (U1). The percentage of
openly unemployed people in the economically active
population (EAP). The EAP in Mexico includes people 12
years and older who, at the time of the reference survey
period, did not work at least one hour during the week,
but who were either seeking employment or were trying to
become self-employed.
Alternative open unemployment rate (U2). The
openly unemployed plus those in the economically inac-
tive population who have stopped looking for a job and
instead decided to stay home or pursue studies, but who
were available for employment. Also included in this def-
inition are those people who will be starting a job in the
four weeks after the reference survey period.
Real economic pressure rate (U3). The proportion of
people in the EAP who were unemployed or who were
employed but looking for a second job.
Real preference pressure rate (U4). The openly
unemployed and those people in the EAP who were
employed but who were seeking to switch jobs.
Mexican Unemployment Measures
General pressure rate (U5). The openly unemployed
and those people in the EAP who were seeking either a
second job or to switch jobs.
Part-time employment less than 15 hours and
unemployment rate (U6). The openly unemployed and
those people in the EAP who worked less than 15 hours
during the reference week.
Part-time employment due to market conditions
and unemployment rate (U7). The openly unemployed
and those people in the EAP who, because of market
conditions, worked less than 35 hours during the refer-
ence week.
Part-time employment less than 35 hours and
unemployment rate (U8). The openly unemployed and
the proportion of people in the EAP who worked less than
35 hours a week.
Employment at less than the minimum wage and
unemployment rate (U9). The openly unemployed and
the proportion of people in the EAP who were employed
during the reference week but who earned less than the
minimum wage.
Critical conditions of employment rate (U10). The
proportion of the employed who worked less than 35
hours per week due to market conditions, those who
worked more than 35 hours per week but earned less
than the minimum wage, and/or those who worked more
than 48 hours per week but earned less than two mini-
mum wages.
General rate of employment needs (U11). The pro-
portion of people in the economically active and inactive
populations who were openly unemployed during the 
reference survey period but who were available to work
even if they have stopped searching for a job, who will
start a job soon, who were employed but were seeking
either a second job or to switch jobs, or who worked less
than 15 hours during the reference week.
The chart shows the trend in Mexico’s open unem-
ployment rate and in its 10 complementary unemploy-
ment indicators during 1990–98. All complementary indi-
cators show higher unemployment rates for Mexico
throughout the period. Also, though all unemployment
indicators rose during the 1995 economic crisis, all also
have come down since then so that, in general, it can be
said that Mexico’s overall unemployment situation has
improved since 1995.
Still, it can be somewhat misleading to talk about a
3.2-percent open unemployment rate in 1998 (U1) when,
in the same year, for example, 13.6 percent of the popu-
lation was either unemployed or underemployed because
they worked less than 35 hours per week or earned less
than the minimum wage (U10).
1 The definitions are from Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e
Informática (INEGI), the official source for unemployment data in Mexico.
Also, for a comprehensive analysis of unemployment indicators in Mexico,
see Susan Fleck and Constance Sorrentino, “Employment and
Unemployment in Mexico’s Labor Force,” Monthly Labor Review, Bureau
of Labor Statistics, November 1994, pp. 3–31.
Mexico’s Open Unemployment and 
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5 Issue 1 • 19991999 PERFORMANCE AND OUTLOOK
The Exchange Rate, Interest Rates and the Price of Oil
Two weeks into 1999, Mexico faced yet
another external shock. On January 13, Brazil
devalued its currency, the real, by 8 percent; yet
by January 15, given the market’s negative reac-
tion to this development, Brazil was forced to
allow the real to float freely in the exchange rate
markets.
The expected contagion on Mexico’s financial
markets quickly materialized as the peso weak-
ened considerably during those days (Chart 12 ).
Interestingly, however, though the contagion this
time stemmed from a country within the same
region, the negative effects on Mexico were rela-
tively short-lived. Just a week after the Brazilian
real’s devaluation, the peso regained stability and
has strengthened considerably ever since. Thus,
after dipping to a rate of 10.6 pesos per dollar on
January 14, four months later—on May 14—the
exchange rate traded at 9.3 pesos per dollar.
It is apparent that with the Brazilian crisis,
international investors differentiated more among
emerging markets and, recognizing Mexico’s over-
all solid fundamentals, decided not to exit the
country as they had during Russia’s debt default in
1998. Hence, rather than spreading, contagion this
time was quickly contained. Interest rates in
Mexico, for example, followed the same path as
the exchange rate—rebounding in mid-January
but subsequently declining (Chart 13 ). The rates
for  Cetes and TIIP reached 19.8 and 22.93, re-
spectively, on May 28.
A stabilizing influence on Mexico’s economic
performance this year has been the oil price
recovery. While in January the average export
price of Mexican oil averaged $8.61 per barrel, by
Chart 11
Foreign Direct Investment in Mexico, 1994–98
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Chart 12
Exchange Rate, 1999
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6 Business Frontierearly May it had gone up to $14.96 per barrel. And
though the price has come down somewhat since
then, it remains considerably above its level near
the start of the year (Chart 14 ). Thus, unlike in
1998, when Mexico was having to adapt its public-
finance situation to accommodate a declining oil
price, so far this year Mexico has enjoyed a favor-
able oil-price scenario.
Even though this year the external environ-
ment has not caused the uncertainty it did last
year for the Mexican economy, it is not incon-
ceivable that some shocks may still emerge before
year-end. One external development that nega-
tively impacted Mexico’s financial markets
occurred in the latter part of May. Argentina was
rumored to be moving toward abandoning its cur-
rency board with the U.S. dollar, which caused the
peso to weaken to 9.786 on May 27. But, as was
the case last year, Mexican authorities are expected
to act with the proper fiscal or monetary policies,
or both, to contain any negative effects of this or
any other external shock.
Other Key Macroeconomic Indicators
First quarter 1999 figures show Mexico’s real
GDP annual growth at 1.9 percent. Compared
with previous quarters, this marks a deceleration
in Mexico’s growth (Chart 15 ). Industrial produc-
tion, for example, recorded annual growth of 1.8
percent in the first quarter after advancing 6.6 per-
cent last year. However, fixed capital investment
showed a healthy performance in the first three
months of 1999, with annual growth of over 3 per-
cent. Moreover, employment in the same period
grew at an annual rate of 6.4 percent, while the
open unemployment rate averaged 2.9 percent.
Maquiladora employment continued strong in the
first quarter, with annual growth of 10.4 percent.
1
On the trade front, although annual growth in
both exports and imports was quite slow in
January, it picked up in the following months.
Export growth surpassed import growth slightly
during the first quarter of the year at 6.5 percent
and 4.1 percent, respectively.
Retail sales in the first three months of 1999
registered annual growth of just over 1 percent,
due largely to stagnant growth in January (0.7 per-
cent) and negative growth in February (–0.1 per-
cent). March, however, showed an important
rebound as annual growth in this indicator
equaled 2.7 percent.
Finally, monthly inflation has been on a
downward trend since the beginning of the year
(Chart 16 ). The April rate recorded by the con-
sumer price index was 0.92 percent. The rate in
May’s first two weeks was 0.24 percent relative to
the previous two-week period—the lowest two-
week gain since 1994.
Outlook
Mexico’s economic growth in 1999 is expected
to be below last year’s, while inflation is expected
to improve relative to 1998. The official 1999 tar-
gets for GDP growth and inflation are 3 percent
and 13 percent, respectively. Private-sector fore-
casts, on the other hand, show lower growth and
higher inflation. However, as Table 2 shows,
expectations by private-sector analysts have been
improving since the beginning of the year as their
forecasts in May placed growth higher—and infla-
tion lower—relative to January. Obviously, the
Mexican economy’s favorable performance in the
first five months is increasing analysts’ optimism
about their year-end outlooks.
In a more regional perspective, of the three
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7 Issue 1 • 1999Mexico and Argentina—only Mexico will record
positive growth in 1999. According to the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, both Brazil and Argen-
tina will be in recession this year, with their
economies expected to contract 3.8 percent and
1.5 percent, respectively.
CONCLUSION
Mexico was one of the fastest growing econo-
mies last year. Although Mexico’s economy was
subject to a series of external shocks throughout
1998, authorities responded with the proper fiscal
and monetary policies to contain the adverse
effects of these developments. The net outcome
for the country was lower-than-expected growth
and higher-than-expected inflation.
In 1999, Mexico has met with a more favor-
able set of external conditions. Moreover, author-
ities continue to pursue sound fiscal and monetary
policies. This combination will allow Mexico to
continue growing this year under a less inflation-
ary scenario.
—Lucinda Vargas
1 For a review of the maquiladora industry’s performance
through 1998, see Business Frontier, Issues 3 and 4, 1998.
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Table 2
1999 Mexican Economic Outlook
Official Private sector*
Jan. Feb. Mar. Apr. May
Real GDP,
annual rate (%) 3.0 2.3 2.4 2.7 2.7 2.9
Inflation,
December to
December (%) 13.0 16.5 15.8 15.3 15.1 14.5
*Based on Banco de México’s monthly survey of 25 to 33 private 
economic analysis groups.
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